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Abstract 
Successful preservation of environmentally and historically significant 
property requires the utilization of various innovative land conservation 
strategies.  The government has three alternative land conservation 
strategies, including (1) using the police power to issue environmental and 
land use regulations; (2) the use of the eminent domain power over 
environmentally sensitive lands; and (3) the use of conservation easement 
programs.  The government’s use of its inherent police power to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens extends to state and local 
governments the ability to use zoning and land-use regulations for 
environmental purposes.  Typically, these regulations are used broadly as 
part of a comprehensive land use plan.  The federal government has the 
power to make environmental laws based on its constitutional powers over 
commerce and treaty making.  However, land use and environmental 
regulations are often politically difficult since such regulations interfere 
directly with a private landowners’ use of his or her property.  Land use and 
environmental regulations also have the potential to rise to the level of a 
Fifth Amendment regulatory taking, requiring the payment of just 
compensation for the loss of property rights by the government to the 
property owner.  Federal, state, and/or local governments may use eminent 
domain to acquire fee simple title to lands it seeks to preserve.  However, 
the government’s use of the eminent domain power may be expensive 
relative to other alternatives, since just compensation for the land may be 
high and the eminent domain process may result in long and expensive 
litigation.  Inadequate public funding for acquisitions and political 
unpopularity also may limit the use of eminent domain.   
Conservation easements often represent a more politically palatable 
alternative for land preservation.  Despite the inherent incentive problems 
associated with conservation easement donations, the use of easements as 
a land conservation method is increasing at an incredible rate - mostly due 
to the Federal and state tax benefits associated with the donation of 
conservation easements.  Landowners are typically motivated to donate 
conservation easements by the landowners’ desire to forever preserve the 
character of the land and to receive tax breaks in the forms of state tax 
credits and/or federal deductions for “qualified conservation contributions”. 
While most currently created conservation easements are donated, many 
land trusts and governmental entities are also in the business of purchasing 
them.  Conservation easements may also be created by the use of eminent 
domain, or by way of exaction.  “Exacted” conservation easements generally 
arise where the government requires that a landowner donate a 
conservation easement in exchange for the government approving a permit 
or zoning variance application.  While donations and sales of conservation 
easements are likely to avoid the requirement that the government pay the 
property holder just compensation, such compensation may need to be paid 
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 2014 
217 
where the landowner brings an action for inverse condemnation following 
the creation of an exacted conservation easement. 
The use of conservation easements can raise constitutional issues 
where the government seeks to create the easement by way of regulation or 
exaction.  In this article, the author: (1) provides an overview of the different 
systems of land control; (2) analyzes the ability of a landowner to argue that 
a regulatory taking has occurred where government land use and/or 
environmental regulations have greatly diminished the property’s value; (3) 
specifically discusses the landowner’s ability to grant or sell a conservation 
easement as a potential source of value to the landowner that could negate 
the finding of a sufficient diminution in value necessary to be considered a 
compensable Fifth Amendment taking; (4) addresses the government’s 
ability to garner a conservation easement through the exercise of its powers 
of eminent domain; (5) discusses regulatory takings issues specific to 
conservation easements acquired by exaction and failed government 
attempts to acquire such conservation easements; and (6) discusses the 
question of whether the government may exercise its powers of eminent 
domain to condemn a preexisting conservation easement held by another 
government entity. 
I. Introduction
Successful preservation of environmentally and historically significant
property requires the utilization of various innovative land conservation 
strategies.1  The government has three alternative land conservation 
strategies.  First, the government may use its inherent police power to 
regulate the land to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. 
State and local governments may carry out conservation goals through 
zoning and land-use regulations.2  Zoning and land use regulations are 
typically used on a broad scale, often as a part of comprehensive land 
planning.  Federal environmental laws can also place restrictions on 
activities.3  The federal government has the power to make environmental 
1. Steven M. Hoffman, Open Space Procurement Under Colorado’s Scenic Easement
Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 383, 383 (1989). 
2. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).  The United States
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of zoning and land-use 
planning.  See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
3. The distinction here is a tricky (but perhaps meaningless) one.  Land-use
regulation is a realm of state power, but the federal government can pass 
environmental regulations.  The line between land-use regulation and environmental 
regulation is a hazy one that would be difficult to draw.  The debate is not important 
for the purposes of this Article.  The point is merely that multiple levels of 
government can create valid laws that restrict activities of landowners.  If the courts 
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laws based on its constitutional powers over commerce and treaty making. 
Land use and environmental regulations are often politically untenable 
since such regulations prevent a landowner from making certain uses on 
their property, which many Americans view as a violation of a fundamental 
property right.  Therefore, there has been somewhat of a reluctance to pass 
comprehensive environmental and land use regulations.  Furthermore, land 
use and environmental regulations could rise to the level of a Fifth 
Amendment regulatory taking, requiring the payment of just compensation 
for the loss of property rights by the government to the property owner.4 
Second, the government (federal, state, and/or local) may use the 
power of eminent domain to acquire fee simple title to lands it seeks to 
preserve.  Of course, the government must pay the property owner just 
compensation for the property acquired when the government exercises its 
power of eminent domain.5  The government’s use of the eminent domain 
power may be expensive relative to other alternatives, since just 
compensation for the land may be high and the eminent domain process 
may result in long and expensive litigation.  Inadequate public funding has 
also made fee acquisition of open lands increasingly problematic.6  
Furthermore, the use of eminent domain often creates feelings of 
resentment in the community against the authorizing elected officials. 
Therefore, governments may find that the use of its eminent domain power 
is not a very efficient and politically tenable way to foster conservation 
goals. 
Third, the government may use conservation easement7 programs as a 
land conservation tool.  Conservation easements often represent a more 
decide that the federal government’s regulations have moved from a federal to state 
realm, they may invalidate environmental statutes.  If that were to happen, the 
enforceability of the conservation easements negotiated under those laws may be 
called into question. 
4. See generally Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
5. Furthermore, the land must be acquired for a valid public purpose.
6. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 383.
7. A conservation easement is a nonpossessory interest in land restricting a
landowner’s ability to use land in an otherwise permissible way with the goal of 
yielding a conservation benefit.  A conservation easement is a legal contract that 
entails the transfer of certain “sticks” in the “bundle of rights” to either the 
government entity or a charitable entity with the means and will to conserve the 
property and is therefore a “partial interest” in land.  See Cheever, infra note 14.  The 
property owner, or grantor of the easement, retains the possessory interest in the 
land while transferring to the grantee the right to prevent the grantor or anyone else 
from engaging in certain activities that would be detrimental to the grantee’s 
conservation goals, in perpetuity.  See id.; James Boyd, Kathryn Caballero & R. David 
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politically palatable alternative to land use and environmental regulations 
(at least where such regulations would rise to the level of a compensable 
Fifth Amendment taking) or the exercise of the government’s power of 
eminent domain to acquire property in fee simple.8  Despite the inherent 
incentive problems associated with conservation easement donations,9 the 
use of easements as a land conservation method is increasing at an 
incredible rate10—mostly due to the Federal and state tax benefits 
associated with the donation of conservation easements.11  Conservation 
Simpson, The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement 
Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 215 (2000).  
8. Donated and sold conservation easements are more politically viable
because such methods of acquisition are completely voluntary.  “Exacted” 
conservation easements may be more politically tenable where the donating party 
receives sufficient consideration in exchange for the exaction, thereby not making 
the donor-constituent feel coerced or extorted into donating a conservation 
easement.  Lastly, conservation easements acquired by eminent domain are more 
politically tenable than would be acquiring the entire property in fee simple by 
eminent domain. 
9. Individuals who are most likely to voluntarily surrender development rights
are those who think they will be burdened the least by the restrictions.  The burden, 
here, represents primarily the degree to which the individuals would have to change 
their land use plans under the terms of the conservation easement.  Therefore, 
conservation easements are most effective in protecting undeveloped land that is 
owned by an individual or firm that does not plan on developing their land.  See  
John Echeverria, Skeptic’s Perspective on Voluntary Conservation Easements, ECOSYSTEM 
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 2005), http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/article.opinio 
n.php?component_id=3822&component_version_id=5435&language_id=12.
10. Anna Vinson, Re-Allocating the Conservation Landscape: Conservation Easements
and Regulation Working in Concert, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 275 (2007).  In 1950, 
there were only 53 land trusts in existence.  By 2000, that number exceeded 1,200, 
and in the five years between 2000 and 2005, another 400 land trusts were 
established, bringing the total to 1,667.  In 2000, there were 2,514,545 acres under 
easement by local and state land trusts.  By 2005, that number increased by 148% to 
6,245,969 acres.  See 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, at 
3, 8 (2005), available at http://www.northolympiclandtrust.org/Documents/2005Land 
TrustCensusReport.pdf [hereinafter 2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS]. 
11. See 2005 LAND TRUST CENSUS, supra note 10.  The Land Trust Alliance has put
forth a substantial effort towards expanding the tax benefits of donating 
conservation easements and was awarded in 2006 with a congressional bill that 
provided expanded relief.  See also 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, at 4 
(2006), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about/who-we-are/annual-report/ 
2006AnnualReport.pdf/at_download/file.  
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easements may be donated, sold, exacted, or taken under the government’s 
power of eminent domain (taking merely use and development rights, rather 
than an entire fee simple interest in the land).  
Landowners are typically motivated to donate conservation easements 
by the landowner’s desire to forever preserve the character of the land and 
to receive tax breaks in the forms of state tax credits and/or federal 
deductions for “qualified conservation contributions.”12  Sellers of 
conservation easement interests are typically motivated by: (1) the money 
made directly from the sale of the conservation easement interest; (2) the 
landowner’s desire to forever preserve the character of the land; and/or (3) 
property tax benefits from lowering the landowner’s fair market value by 
limiting future use and development (and sometimes federal income tax 
benefits associated with a deeply discounted partial sale of a conservation 
easement property interest).13  While most currently created conservation 
easements are donated, many land trusts and governmental entities are also 
in the business of purchasing them (at least at a deeply discounted fair 
market value in the context of a “partial sale/partial donation”).14  Most 
conservation easements are donated15—rather than sold, “taken,” or 
“exacted”—because government entities and land trusts generally have 
Many states have incorporated deductions into the law as well, which also serve as 
considerable motivation for the donation of conservation easements.  See, e.g., Illana 
Poley, Conservation Easements Protect Colorado Open Space at Year-End, CHERRY CREEK NEWS 
(Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.thecherrycreeknews.com/news-mainmenu-2/1-latest/2243-
conservation-easements-protect-colorado-open-space-at-year-end.html (describing 
the “flurry of year-end activity to finalize conservation easements” in Colorado that 
resulted from a change in the law, going into effect Jan. 1, 2008, that would raise the 
tax standards). 
12. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(E) (2012).
13. See PAUL ELCONIN & VALERIE A. LUZADIS, EVALUATING LANDOWNER SATISFACTION 
WITH CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS 9-11 (1997). 
14. See Federico Cheever, Property Rights and the Maintenance of Wildlife Habitat: The
Case for Conservation Land Transaction, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 431, 432 (2002); All About 
Conservation Easements, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.nature. 
org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/
about/allabout.html; Conservation Options for Landowners, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE (Oct. 12, 
2007), http://199.238.135.238/conserve/options.htm. 
15. Conservation easements do not represent a “free market solution” to
environmental problems.  Most conservation easements are voluntarily donated 
because of the tax benefits that such donations provide for the donor, and as a 
result, “[t]he lion’s share of the funding for easements . . . comes out of the pocket of 
the taxpayer.”  See Echeverria, supra note 9. 
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limited funds to put towards the outright purchase of conservation 
easements or the paying of just compensation. 
Conservation easements (or a property owner’s use and/or 
development potentially subject to the placing upon of a conservation 
easement) are likely considered to be compensable property interests, able 
to be taken by the government through the exercise of its power of eminent 
domain.  If a conservation easement were found to be a compensable 
property interest and such interest was taken by the government under its 
eminent domain power, the government would clearly owe just 
compensation to the holder of the property’s use and/or development rights 
to the extent such rights are affected by the conservation easement. 
However, there may exist some issues of sovereignty when preexisting 
conservation easements held by government entities are purportedly taken 
by another government entity through its power of eminent domain.  An 
example might be where the federal government decides that it is necessary 
to build clean energy windmills upon preexisting conservation easement 
land that prevents the development of structures like windmills. 
“Exacted” conservation easements generally arise where the 
government requires that a landowner donate a conservation easement in 
exchange for the government approving a permit or zoning variance 
application.16  “Exacted” conservation easements are typically much cheaper 
to the federal government than having to pay just compensation for a 
conservation easement taken under the government’s power of eminent 
domain.17  Unlike donated and sold conservation easements, exacted 
conservation easements are not generally “voluntary” in the fullest sense of 
the word, and this motivational difference generally raises concerns 
regarding the enforceability of these conservation easements.18  While 
16. Exacted conservation easements are often mandated mitigation measures
under environmental and land use regulations.  Property owners seeking to change 
their land must often obtain federal, state, and local permits.  Increasingly, permit 
issuers require mitigation measures to compensate for environmental degradation or 
harms created by proposed projects.  At times, these mitigation measures take the 
form of conservation easements.  Exacted conservation easements are mitigation 
requirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than land protection.  See 
JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK xi (1988). 
17. So long as the conservation easement “exaction” can avoid the
requirement that the government pay just compensation for the property interests 
received. 
18. While the grantor of an exacted conservation easement must consent to its
formation, the creation of an exacted conservation easement is not the grantor’s idea 
and is generally conceded to by the grantor in order to obtain some larger and more 
immediate land use goal.  Exacted conservation easements are mitigation 
requirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than land protection. 
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donations and sales of conservation easements are likely to avoid the 
requirement that the government pay the property holder just 
compensation,19 just compensation may need to be paid where the 
landowner brings an action for inverse condemnation following the creation 
of an exacted conservation easement.20 
This Article will address limits on the government’s eminent domain 
power and relevant Fifth Amendment takings issues related to the various 
above-described land conservation methods.  Section II will analyze the 
ability of a landowner to argue that a regulatory taking has occurred where 
government land use and/or environmental regulations have greatly 
diminished the property’s value.  Section II also specifically discussed the 
landowner’s ability to grant or sell a conservation easement as a potential 
source of value to the landowner that could negate the finding of a sufficient 
diminution in value necessary to be considered a compensable Fifth 
Amendment taking.  Section III addresses the government’s ability to garner 
a conservation easement through the exercise of its powers of eminent 
domain.  Section IV discusses regulatory takings issues specific to 
conservation easements acquired by exaction and failed government 
attempts to acquire such conservation easements.  Section V turns to the 
question of whether the government may exercise its powers of eminent 
domain to condemn a preexisting conservation easement21 held by another 
government entity. 
Although the grantor engages in the transactions willingly, exacted conservation 
easements should not be viewed in the same light as donated and sold conservation 
easements because the incentives and benefits of donated and sold conservation 
easements are very different from those associated with exacted conservation 
easements.  See Diehl, supra note 16. 
19. See JOHN J. COSTONIS ET AL., REGULATION V. COMPENSATION IN LAND-USE CONTROL: 
A RECOMMENDED ACCOMMODATION, A CRITIQUE, AND AN INTERPRETATION (1977); DAVID D. 
GREGORY, THE EASEMENT AS A CONSERVATION TECHNIQUE (1972).  Denials of use 
applications stemming from failed exaction negotiations are also likely to avoid the 
requirement of paying just compensation for the loss of the land use (discussed in 
greater detail in Section V, below, infra). 
20. See Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1226 (N.Y. 2004) (Read, J.
dissenting); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. District v. Koontz, 861 So. 2d 1267,1268 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  And just compensation would very likely have to be paid where 
the government exercises its power of eminent domain to condemn a conservation 
easement interest on private property (as noted above). 
21. Created in any manner—by donation, sale, exercise of eminent domain, or
exaction. 
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II. Regulatory Takings Analysis in the Context of
Comprehensive Land Use and Environmental
Regulations
This section will analyze the ability of a landowner to argue that a
regulatory taking has occurred where government land use and/or 
environmental regulations have greatly diminished the property’s value.  A 
brief overview of the general law relating to regulatory takings will be 
followed by an analysis of whether comprehensive environmental and/or 
land use regulations may be considered a regulatory taking.  Subsection C 
specifically involves the issue of whether the ability to garner a financial 
benefit through the voluntary sale or donation of a conservation easement 
may factor in to such a regulatory takings analysis. 
A. General Regulatory Takings Law
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Supreme Court of the United 
States recognized that government action may constitute a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, even where there is no direct 
governmental invasion or appropriation of property.22  In Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. City of New York, the Supreme Court of the United 
States identified several factors significant to the inquiry of whether 
government action constitutes a regulatory taking, including: (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which 
the government has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations; 
and (3) the character of the governmental action (for example, whether the 
government action is a physical invasion).23  The Penn Central factor test is 
the general regulatory takings test; however, three exceptions exist to the 
Penn Central factor test—each of which trigger heightened review.  The three 
exceptions that extend the Penn Central factor test involve: (1) actual indirect 
physical appropriations of property (“per se” regulatory takings); (2) 
regulations that deny landowners of all economically beneficial use of 
property; and (3) exactions. 
Specifically, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court 
held that regulations that completely deprive a property owner of all 
economically beneficial use of the property constitute a regulatory taking.24  
In Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
22. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  In Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court held that any physical 
invasion by the government onto private property is a per se taking, requiring the 
payment of just compensation.  See 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
23. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
24. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992).
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whether government action could be found to constitute a regulatory taking, 
holding that where an action does not substantially advance legitimate interests, 
the issue is relevant to a due process argument, rather than an eminent 
domain issue.25  
B. Application of Regulatory Takings Law to Comprehensive
Land Use and Environmental Regulations
Comprehensive land use and environmental regulations could 
conceivably rise to the level that such regulations completely deprive scenic 
open space property of all economically beneficial use in violation of a 
property owner’s reasonable and distinct investment backed expectations,26 
and thus violates due process.27  For example, an individual that purchased 
mining land 20 years ago (whose highest and best use, at the time, was 
known to be mining), could have a valid regulatory takings claim and/or due 
process claim if the recent environmental and land use regulations have 
deprived the land of all economically beneficial use.  
C. Whether a Landowner’s Ability to Voluntarily Sell or
Donate a Conservation Easement Constitutes an
Economic Use Sufficient to Defeat a Regulatory Takings
Claim
Some commentators have argued that a landowner’s ability to donate 
or sell a conservation easement represents a potential economic use for 
regulated land that could help to avoid a regulatory taking by lessening the 
economic impact of environmental and land use regulations.  However, a 
donor whose land use is already strictly regulated at the time of donation is 
unlikely to receive the federal income tax benefits associated with the 
donation of a “qualified conservation contribution.”28  Because a takings 
25. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005).
26. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
27. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 383.
28. The amount of a “qualified conservation contribution” is determined by
comparing the value of the property, considering the highest and best permitted uses 
both pre- and post-donation.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (2009); Whitehouse 
Hotel LP v. Commissioner, 131 TC 112 (2008).  Where land use is already strictly 
limited, the granting of a conservation easement would be unlikely to prohibit 
additional uses and thus have little effect on the difference in value pre- and post-
donation.  Valuation of a property before contribution of a conservation easement 
should take into account environmental, zoning, conservation, or historic 
preservation laws that would restrict development of the property.  See S. Rep. No. 
96-1007, at 15 (1980), 1980 WL 12915.
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claimant would not be able to realize these tax benefits, the source of a 
conservation easement’s economic value in the takings analysis must reside 
in the ability to sell it.29  Thus, the crucial questions becomes whether 
demand and a market for selling conservation easements truly exists.  If a 
market for selling conservation easements is found to exist, the ability to 
sell a conservation easement could conceivably be considered an economic 
use that could support the defeat of a takings claim.  
In order for the sale of conservation easements to represent an 
economic use, the government must show that there is a “demand for such 
use in the reasonably near future.”30  In order to determine whether demand 
exists for a particular use, an examination must be made as to whether a 
significant number of individuals would be willing to purchase the property 
in spite of the land use restrictions.31  Because land use trusts have limited 
resources to purchase interests in private land, only certain parcels of 
noteworthy conservation value are likely to be sought for outright purchase. 
Therefore, it must first be determined whether the regulated property is 
“conservation-worthy” (i.e., whether the property has ecological or historical 
qualities deserving of conservation).  Where the regulated parcel has been 
developed, polluted, or otherwise harmed (or where a significant investment 
would be required to rehabilitate the ecological integrity of the parcel), the 
development rights on that parcel of land are unlikely to elicit any demand 
on the conservation easement “market.”  However, it must also be 
determined whether there is a reasonable probability that potential buyers 
would have sufficient funds to purchase the development rights.  
If it is determined that the “market” for conservation easements is 
speculative in nature, then the sale of an easement will not be considered a 
viable economic use that would support the defeat of a takings claim.32  
Conservation easements are currently bought and sold on an open market. 
However, more often than not, the purchaser of conservation easements is a 
local land trust that operates as the lone purchaser of conservation 
easements in the community.33  Therefore, it is arguable whether 
conservation easements are currently bought and sold on a competitive 
29. See, e.g., The Nature Conservancy, supra note 14; Margaret Jackson, Ranchers
Rush to Secure Conservation Easements, DENVER POST (Nov. 4, 2007), at 1C (reporting the 
rush to secure conservation easements before the temporary increase in federal 
income tax benefits expired). 
30. See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 262 (2001) (quoting Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 158 (1990)). 
31. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1243 (D. Nev. 1999). 
32. See United States v. 341.45 Acres, 633 F.2d 108, 112 (8th Cir. 1980).
33. See Vinson, supra note 10.
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market.  Most importantly, there is the issue of whether a land trust, when 
faced with the decision to expend some of its limited funds to secure an 
easement, would choose to spend those funds on a regulated parcel or on a 
non-regulated parcel.  Most likely, a land trust would choose to expend its 
limited funds on a nonregulated parcel since the goal of most land trusts is 
to get as much conservation bang for its buck as possible.34  Land trusts may 
treat the passing of a restrictive environmental regulation as a victory, and 
as a result, place no further efforts towards securing the ecological qualities 
of the properties affected by the regulation.  As a result, there is a significant 
possibility that whatever “market” existing for conservation easements on 
non-regulated parcels of land may disappear once development on that 
property is restricted by governmental regulation.   
Since there may be no demand or competitive market for the sale of a 
conservation easement on property that is already strictly regulated, the 
ability of a property owner to sell a conservation easement is very likely not 
an economic use sufficient to support the defeat of a takings claim.35  A 
finding that the ability to sell a conservation easement is not an “economic 
use” of property would prevent the government from successfully claiming 
that a landowner’s ability to garner some money from the sale of a 
conservation easement preregulated property is sufficient to defeat a 
regulatory takings claim, thereby requiring the payment of just 
compensation rather than a diminished sales price.  Since increases in land 
use and environmental regulations are already considered politically 
untenable at times to some, the extra cost of having to pay just 
compensation could easily cause the government to prefer public 
acquisition of private conservation easement property to such regulations 
(particularly considering the due process limitations36 of the police power, 
which constrains the effectiveness of restrictive zoning37).38  
34. However, a land trust may nonetheless decide to purchase a conservation
easement on regulated land since: (1) the land trust may desire to conserve the 
property in perpetuity (as opposed to the temporary nature of environmental and 
land use regulations which may change as the political winds shift); (2) the land trust 
may want access to monitor and steward the conservation goals. 
35. However, if there were demand and a competitive market for conservations
on regulated property, courts may hold that a takings claim would not lie unless 
there exists at least a 75% dimunition in value.  If the sale of a conservation 
easement on preregulated property can bring over 25% of the land’s preregulation 
fair market value, a regulatory takings would not lie.  While 25% may still be a 
considerable amount of money, it is likely much less than what the government 
would have to pay as “just compensation” if a takings were found to exist. 
36. Unlike the enforcement of strict environmental and land use regulations,
voluntary conservation easements (i.e., donated and sold conservation easements) 
do not raise constitutional due process issues.  However, as noted in Section IV, 
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The bottom line is that effective environmental and land use 
regulations can slow unwelcome development.  However, where 
environmental and land use regulations go too far in preventing unwelcome 
development without compensating the landowner, the government has the 
incentive to avoid the payment of just compensation by instead acquiring a 
conservation easement through donation or deeply discounted partial 
sale/partial donation.39  As noted in sections III and IV, below, infra, 
conservation easements acquired and held in arguably involuntary manners 
either through government “exactions” or the governments’ exercise of its 
eminent domain powers, may constitute a compensable regulatory taking, 
requiring the payment of just compensation.40 
III. The Government’s Ability to Garner a Conservation
Easement Through the Exercise of Eminent Domain
Numerous federal and state laws allow government entities to
condemn or “take” conservation easements (or use and development rights 
of land potentially subject to a conservation easement) under the power of 
eminent domain.41  However, the law in a waning42 minority of jurisdictions 
below, infra, conservation easements acquired through exaction may entail due 
process concerns, like those found in Lingle. 
37. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 383.
38. In sum, regulation is preferable to conservation easements in the following
situations: (1) where the expenditure of a large amount of public funding is involved; 
(2) where a sweeping, regional response to a conservation concern is required; (3) to
avoid free riders;  (4) to raise awareness of conservation issues; and (5) to respond to a
community’s interest in conservation.  On the other hand, conservation easements are
preferable to regulation in the following situations: (1) where there is weak political
support for conservation; (2) where landowners distrust the government or favor
deregulation; (3) for conservation in perpetuity; (4) for flexibility of contract; (5) to
conserve large properties as a whole; (6) for unique or unusual properties; (7) to bar all
development; (8) to provide public access; and (9) for affirmative conservation.
39. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 409-10.
40. Conservation easements acquired and held by the government—whether
through “exaction,” sale, donation, or the government’s exercise of its eminent 
domain—are a type of regulation, and thus subject to constitutional limitations (i.e., 
due process, regulatory takings/eminent domain, and sovereignty issues). 
41. See, e.g., JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES
IN LAND § 12:2 (2004). 
42. The minority rule denying compensation to the holder of negative
restrictions on development and use upon the taking of the burdened land is an 
outdated holdover from an earlier time and inconsistent with the modern view of 
property.  For example, California and Texas have abandoned the minority rule in 
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remains that conservation easements are not compensable property 
interests for eminent domain purposes, unlike traditional easements which 
are uniformly respected as compensable property interests whether they are 
held appurtenant or in gross.43  These minority jurisdictions have historically 
argued that conservation easements are more properly characterized as real 
or restrictive covenants in gross (a creation of contract44 not considered a 
compensable property interest for condemnation purposes at common law) 
than as traditional easements.45  However, a majority of commentators and 
jurisdictions have held that conservation easements (whether characterized 
as traditional easements or restrictive covenants in gross) fit neatly within 
the United States Supreme Court’s expansive modern definition of 
“compensable property interest” for eminent domain purposes.46  
favor of the majority rule.  See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 507 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 
1973)(overruling earlier decision and adopting majority rule); City of Houston v. 
McCarthy, 464 S.W.2d 381, 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (holding that damages, as 
opposed to injunctive relief, could be recovered upon taking of restrictive covenants, 
thereby distinguishing earlier case that purported to adopt minority rule). 
43. In United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1961), the
Supreme Court held that the holder of a perpetual in gross flowage easement was 
entitled to just compensation upon the taking of the easement, reasoning that it is 
indisputable that an easement is property that cannot be appropriated for public use 
without just compensation.  See also William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the 
Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another, 56 IOWA L. REV. 293, 301 (1970) (“[E]xtinction of, or 
permanent interference with, an easement, appurtenant or in gross, amounts to a 
compensable taking.”). 
44. See, e.g., Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (holding that
residential-use covenants were “not truly property rights, but contractual rights, 
which the government in the exercise of its sovereign power may take without 
payment of compensation”). 
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 1.6 cmt. a (2000) (noting
that conservation easements, referred to in Restatement as “conservation servitudes,” 
could be either restrictive covenants or negative easements.  Since a conservation 
easement is a negative restriction, rather than an affirmative right, a conservation 
easement could be viewed as a real covenant more than a traditional easement). 
46. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381-84 (1945).  Under
the expansive modern view, a variety of intangible rights or interests in real property 
have been treated as compensable property for eminent domain purposes, including: 
(1) appurtenant and in gross easements; (2) restrictive covenants; (3) leasehold interests; (4)
interests of mortgagees; (5) life estates; (6) remainders; and (7) reversions.  See 2 JULIUS 
L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 5.02, 5.03, 5.07[2][b] - [4][a], 12D.01 (3d ed.
2007) (stating that negative restrictions on development and use of land are treated as
compensable property in majority of jurisdictions that have addressed issue).
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A majority of state and federal courts that have addressed the issue 
have interpreted the expansive modern definition of “compensable property 
interest” to include negative restrictions on the development and use of one 
parcel that is held appurtenant to a different parcel.47  In a minority of 
jurisdictions that still deny just compensation for the taking of a negative 
restrictive covenants, characterization of a conservation easement as a 
negative restrictive use covenant appurtenant could conceivably prevent a 
property owner from obtaining just compensation upon a government 
taking.48  However, with public policy49 clearly supporting the trend towards 
the majority position,50 such a holding is growingly unlikely.51 
The case of Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency 
provides strong support for the conclusion that in gross restrictions 
constitute compensable property.52  Hartford stands for the proposition that 
in gross restrictions on the development and use of land have value, and 
47. See generally Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842, 846
(9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Certain Lands in Augusta, 220 F. Supp. 696 (D. Me. 
S.D. 1963); Leigh v. Village of Los Lunas, 108 P.3d 525 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
48. See, e.g., Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1934); United States v.
Certain Lands in Jamestown, 112 F. 622, 627-28 (Cir. Ct. R.I. 1899); Burma Hills Dev. 
Co. v. Marr, 229 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1969). 
49. Considerations of public policy weigh heavily in favor of treating
conservation easements as compensable property for eminent domain purposes.  If 
conservation easements are not treated as compensable property and the 
government were permitted to acquire conservation easement-encumbered property 
for a restricted value, conservation easement-encumbered property would become 
an attractive target for condemnation because it would be less expensive to 
condemn than similar unencumbered land.  Such a holding would undermine the 
conservation goals of conservation easement donors.  
50. The trend in more recent cases has been to adopt the majority rule and the
majority rule was even adopted by the Restatement (First) of Property and the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 566 
(1944); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.8 reporter’s note; Dible v. City of 
Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. 1999); Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. 
Frankel, 470 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting “rather formidable array 
of authority” in support of majority rule); Morley v. Jackson Redevelopment Auth., 
632 So. 2d 1284, 1297 (Miss. 1994). 
51. See Paul B. Edelberg & Charles C. Goetsch, Hartford National Bank and Trust
Company v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Bristol, 164 Conn. 337, 321 A.2d 469 (1973): 
Establishing the Compensability and Value of Restrictive Covenants and Easements in Gross, 7 
CONN. L. REV. 403 (1975). 
52. See Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 321 A.2d 469
(Conn. 1973). 
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that such value can be measured by the extent to which extinguishment of 
the restrictions increases the value of the burdened land.53  Moreover, 
although the issue of whether the in gross restrictions constituted 
compensable property for eminent domain purposes was not before the 
court, the court satisfied itself that such restrictions were a species of 
property.54  Accordingly, the court implicitly recognized in gross restrictions 
as a compensable form of property for eminent domain purposes.55  The in 
gross status of conservation easements should not prevent them from being 
treated as compensable property interests for eminent domain purposes. 
As the courts in both Hartford and Morley recognized, the right to control the 
use of land can be a valid, enforceable, and therefore valuable right 
independent of its connection to a benefited parcel.  
As noted above, conservation easements generally do not restrict the 
government’s ability to exercise eminent domain powers.  Easement-
enabling statutes in half of the states expressly provide that conservation 
easements (and a property owner’s use and/or development rights that 
could be subjected to a conservation easement) are subject to the power of 
eminent domain.56  In addition, even in states without explicit easement-
enabling statutes, the eminent domain power is generally exercisable in a 
majority of jurisdictions.57  Accordingly, absent a waning minority of 
jurisdictions, government is generally free to exercise its eminent domain 
power to condemn a privately held conservation easement property interest 
upon property, although the government would be required to pay just 
53. See id. at 473.
54. See id.
55. See id.; Morley, 632 So. 2d at 1297, aff’d 874 So. 2d 973 (Miss. 2004) (holding
that where landholders or their successors in interest wished to use the property for 
a purpose prohibited by a negative covenant in gross, the landholders would have to 
purchase that right from the holder of the negative covenant in gross). 
56. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-272.A (1985) (noting that the Arizona
easement-enabling statute “neither limits nor enlarges the power or purposes of eminent 
domain”); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1010(F) (2006) (noting that Virginia easement-enabling 
statute “does not . . . in any way limit the power of eminent domain as possessed by any 
public body”).  However, a few states have specifically prohibited states and 
municipalities from using their eminent domain power to acquire conservation 
easements.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.010(e) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.725(1) (2003); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-7(1) (West 2005); ALA. CODE § 35-18-2(a) (2004). 
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.8 cmt. A (2000) (“Servitude
benefits like other interests in property may be condemned under the power of 
eminent domain.”); Robert H. Levin, When Forever Proves Fleeting: The Condemnation and 
Conversion of Conservation Land, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 592, 598 (2001) (“Privately held 
conservation easements . . . offer surprisingly little protection from condemnation.”). 
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compensation to the holder of the conservation easement (or the holder to 
use and development rights of land potentially subject to a conservation 
easement).  Both federal and state governments have acknowledged that 
acquisition of conservation easements via eminent domain may be a 
necessary component of land conservation programs.58  Next, this Article will 
address regulatory takings issues relating to conservation easements 
created through government “exaction” immediately below, infra. 
IV. Regulatory Takings Issues Involving Conservation
Easement “Exactions”
A. Regulatory Takings Law Relating to Exactions in General
As noted above, Penn Central identified several factors significant to the 
inquiry of whether government action constitutes a regulatory taking, 
including: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the 
extent to which the government has interfered with distinct investment 
backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.59  The 
Penn Central factor test is the general regulatory takings test; however, an 
exception to the Penn Central factors exists for exactions, under the holdings 
of Nollan and Dolan.60 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the 
Supreme Court discussed land use exactions in the context of a regulatory 
takings analysis.61  If a regulation is found to be an exaction, the regulation 
must meet two requirements in order to avoid being considered an 
impermissible taking.62  First, there must be an essential nexus between the 
legitimate government conservation interest and the regulation.63  Second, 
the regulation must also be roughly proportionate in nature and extent to 
the impact of the proposed development.64  If a regulation found to be an 
exaction does not meet these two requirements, the exaction would be 
considered an impermissible taking and would require that the government 
pay just compensation for the property interests acquired by exaction.65  In 
58. See, e.g., Racine v. United States, 858 F.2d 506, 507 (9th Cir. 1988).
59. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
60. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); See Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 
1228 (N.Y. 2004) (Read, J. dissenting). 
61. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
62. See id.
63. See Nollan, 483 U.S at 837.
64. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
65. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
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Lingle, the Supreme Court held that where an action does not substantially 
advance legitimate interests, a due process argument may also be present.66  
B. Regulatory Takings Law Relating to “Exactions” of
Conservation Easements Specifically
Conservation easements are increasingly created through regulatory 
“exaction,” as part of large development projects with complex permitting 
programs and environmental mitigation requirements.  As noted above, 
“exacted” conservation easements generally arise where the government 
requires, as part of a zoning variance or permit application,67 that a 
developer donate a conservation easement68 for the purpose of mitigating 
the development’s environmental effect.69  The “exacted” terminology is a bit 
confusing because there is a lack of clarity in the courts on what constitutes 
66. The Lingle court discussed two related Fifth Amendment arguments—a due
process argument and a takings argument.  Where the imposition of the conservation 
easement is a violation of the government’s police powers because it is not 
substantially advance a legitimate interest, a due process argument could completely 
invalidate the conservation easement.  An exercise of the government’s police power in 
a manner that is arbitrary and capricious would be unlikely to substantially advance a 
legitimate interest, thereby invalidating the condemnation.  The imposition of a 
conservation easement, although related to a legitimate purpose, could also go so far 
as to constitute a taking, triggering the award of just compensation for the property 
interests taken.  Unfortunately, courts have not always clearly distinguished between 
those two different protections of property rights.  See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005); Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Burgess, 667 So. 
2d 267, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Grogan v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of 
East Hampton, 221 A.D.2d 441 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995).  After Grogan, an analysis of the 
constitutionality of a conservation easement “exaction” must address both the due 
process and takings issues. 
67. When developers and individual landowners want to make changes to the
land, there are often local, state, and federal permit requirements.  See RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 194-96 (2004). 
68. Developers may be required to place some type of conservation easement
on their own land or to purchase a conservation easement on someone else’s land. 
69. Exacted conservation easements are often mandated mitigation measures
under environmental and land use regulations.  Property owners seeking to change 
their land must often obtain federal, state, and local permits.  Increasingly, permit 
issuers require mitigation measures to compensate for environmental degradation or 
harms created by proposed projects.  At times, these mitigation measures take the 
form of conservation easements.  Exacted conservation easements are mitigation 
requirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than land protection.  See 
Diehl, supra note 16. 
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a true “exaction” in the context of conservation easements.70  The case of 
Smith v. Town of Mendon is a great example of the debate over whether the 
required donation of a conservation easement, as part of a land use permit 
application approval process, constitutes a true “exaction.”71 
In Smith, a local land use authority conditioned approval of the permit 
to construct a dwelling on the property owner’s donation of a conservation 
easement on the property.72  In Smith, the property owner challenged the 
requirement as a Fifth Amendment taking, but the court refused to 
categorize the easement donation requirement as an “exaction.”73  Because 
the majority in Smith failed to characterize the conservation easement 
donation requirement as an “exaction”, the majority in Smith did not analyze 
the requirement under the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.74  The 
majority in Smith reasoned that the conservation easement donation 
requirement was not an “exaction” because an “exaction” involves the 
dedication of land for public use and the conservation easement did not 
propose to allow public use of the land.75  Under the more general takings 
test involving the Penn Central factors, the Smith majority determined that a 
takings claim did not lie because: (1) the consideration given for the 
“exaction” (the right to construct a dwelling) was itself a valuable and 
marketable asset; (2) the property was already encumbered by a legitimate 
town ordinance which inhibited development; and (3) the conservation 
substantially the advanced legitimate government purposes of protecting 
environmentally sensitive areas in perpetuity, placing future buyers on 
notice of the limitations, and helping ensure and enforce regulatory 
compliance.76  
However, commentators have sharply criticized the majority opinion in 
Smith, with the minority dissent of Justice Read receiving much wider 
support for its strong public policy arguments.77  In the Smith dissent, Justice 
Read argued that the requirement to donate a conservation easement in 
order to garner a permit to build a dwelling constitutes an “exaction,” and is 
thus subject to heightened review under Nollan and Dolan.78  Justice Read 
70. See Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 2004).
71. See id. at 1214.
72. Id. at 1216.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1219.
76. Id. at 1220-21.
77. See Lara Womack Daniel and James D. Timmons, Conservation Easements and
Eminent Domain at the Intersection; How Modern Legal Creations Meet Constitutional Principles, 
36 REAL EST. L.J. 433 (Spring 2008). 
78. See Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d at 1228 (Read, J. dissenting).
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stated, in the Smith dissent, that public use of the property is not required 
for a conditional approval to constitute an “exaction.”79  Justice Read further 
stated that even if an “exaction” requires that the dedication be for public 
use, the donation of a conservation easement could be considered a public 
use.80  Public use is not synonymous with direct public access in the context 
of takings analyses, and a conservation easement that confers a general 
benefit to the public at large would likely be considered to have been 
donated for a public use (i.e., preservation of scenic/open space or 
environmentally or historically significant property).81  Justice Read further 
argued that the “exaction” constituted a taking under Nolan since the interest 
served by the “exaction” was a legitimate town interest, but there was no 
essential nexus between the “exaction” and the harm created by the 
proposed building of a dwelling.82  Justice Read noted that the easement 
purportedly was validly acquired by “exaction” without the government 
having to pay the purchase price or offer tax benefits.  However, Justice Read 
states that just compensation would be owed for an “exaction” having no 
essential nexus to the harm sought to be prevented.83  Judge Read’s dissent 
provides the framework to challenge a government requirement (as a 
condition to land use permit approval) that the property owner donate a 
conservation easement as a true “exaction”—and thus an impermissible 
taking under the heightened standard applicable to exaction under Nollan 
and Dolan.84 
Unlike donated and sold conservation easements, “exacted” 
conservation easements are not fully voluntary because they do not arise 
out of personal conservation motivations.85  Although donors willingly 
engage in conservation easement “exaction” transactions, “exacted” 
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1227 (Read, J. dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1226 (Read, J. dissenting).
84. Id.
85. While the grantor of an exacted conservation easement must consent to its
formation, the creation of an exacted conservation easement is not the grantor’s idea 
and is generally conceded to by the grantor in order to obtain some larger and more 
immediate land use goal.  Exacted conservation easements are mitigation 
requirements for landowners seeking to fulfill goals other than land protection. 
Although the grantor engages in the transactions willingly, exacted conservation 
easements should not be viewed in the same light as donated and sold conservation 
easements because the incentives and benefits of donated and sold conservation 
easements are very different from those associated with exacted conservation 
easements.  See Diehl, supra note 16. 
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conservation easements should not be viewed in the same light as donated 
and sold conservation easements because the incentives and benefits are so 
different—particularly where landowners are coerced or extorted into 
creating “exacted” conservation easements.86  However, “exacted” 
conservation easements are not created in a truly involuntary manner either, 
unlike conservation easements taken by eminent domain that clearly require 
the paying of just compensation.  Where the government requires that a 
property owner donate a conservation easement as a condition to approving 
such property owner’s land use permit application, the semi-voluntary 
nature of the condition supports a finding that the condition should be 
analyzed as a true “exaction.” 
A true “exaction” of a conservation easement would be more likely to 
constitute a compensable Fifth Amendment taking since, in addition to 
being subjected to the Penn Central factor test and Lingle due process 
challenges, true “exactions” must: (1) display an essential nexus between the 
legitimate government conservation interest and the regulation;87 and (2) be 
roughly proportionate in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development.88  However, owners of the burdened parcel also receive some 
additional benefit from the “exaction” that may factor in to an analysis of 
whether the burdened property has faced a sufficient diminution in value to 
constitute a compensable taking.89  
Where the “exaction” requirement is considered coercive or 
extortionate in comparison to the benefits received by the property owner 
under the arrangement, the “exaction” is unlikely to be found roughly 
proportionate to the nature and extent of the proposed development.  Since 
a coercive “exaction” requirement is not roughly proportionate to the 
benefit, a takings claim would lie and the existence of some minor 
corresponding benefit would be unlikely to defeat the requirement to pay 
just compensation.  Furthermore, a due process claim may lie where such 
coercive actions are also considered arbitrary and capricious.  A due process 
claim would completely invalidate the conservation easement, rather than 
86. In St. Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, a property owner brought
an action for inverse condemnation against a water management district because the 
district conditioned approval of an application to dredge wetlands upon the grant of 
a conservation easement.  In Koontz, the case was dismissed for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction; however, in dicta, the Koontz court stated that had the merits of the claim 
been the basis for the decision, the property owner would have prevailed, implying 
that the government’s extortionate actions constituted a true “exaction” of a 
conservation easement.  See 861 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
87. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
88. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
89. Although “exacted” conservation easements generally do not result in
charitable tax deductions and credits. 
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requiring the payment of just compensation.  As a result of the uncertainty 
surrounding “exaction” requirements that are considered coercive or 
extortionate,90 land use planners should careful consider the relative 
benefits and burdens of “exaction” arrangements to ensure that such 
arrangements are not too slanted in favor of the “exacting” government 
entity.  Where government “exactions” of conservation easements can avoid 
the payment of just compensation, “exactions” may provide a useful land 
conservation tool.  However, such uncertainty limits the value of 
conservation easement “exactions” as a government conservation tool 
because government entities are fearful of pushing the boundaries of 
extortion for fear of: (1) losing the easement altogether under a due process 
challenge; (2) having to pay just compensation under a takings challenge; or 
(3) encountering political ramifications from engaging in hardball
negotiations with constituents.  The next subsection will discuss whether a
failed government attempt to garner an “exacted” conservation easement
could constitute a compensable Fifth Amendment regulatory taking,
requiring the payment of just compensation.
C. Regulatory Takings Law Relating to Failed Government
Actions to Garner Conservation Easement “Exactions”
It is unlikely that a failed government action to “exact” a conservation 
easement will constitute a regulatory taking.  Failed “exaction” claims are 
likely non-cognizable under the Supreme Court’s Nollan and Dolan tests, and 
the non-existent conditions that would form the basis of such claims cannot 
constitute property for takings purposes.91  In some circumstances, a 
property owner might have viable claims under the U.S. Constitution or 
other authorities to challenge the government’s regulatory acts.92  
The permit denial that follows from failed negotiations can serve as 
the basis of a takings claim under the default Penn Central test, albeit one 
with little chance of winning.93  Especially unfair treatment by the regulatory 
agency could serve as the basis for a substantive due process claim under 
the U.S. Constitution—again, one that might exist more in theory than in 
practice.94  However, political pressures and concerns may soften regulatory 
90. Uncertainty exists in determining whether conservation easement
“exactions” are compensable Fifth Amendment takings since the determination 
depends on an ad hoc balancing of the benefits and burdens of the arrangement. 
91. See Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 638-641 (Spring 2012).
92. See id.
93. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542-43 (2005); Fenster, supra note 91. 
94. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2614-15 (2010) (concurring opinion); Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43. (“[T]he Due
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hard bargaining that could lead to conservation easement “exactions” 
failing, especially actions considered to be governmental overreach.95  The 
next section will discuss the effect of a preexisting government-held 
conservation easement upon the government’s ability to condemn such 
property under eminent domain powers. 
V. The Effect of a Preexisting Conservation Easement
Upon the Government’s Ability to Exercise Its Powers of
Eminent Domain
The conservation easement issues previously discussed in this Article
all involved the creation of conservation easement.  However, this section 
discusses whether a preexisting conservation easement affects the 
government’s power of eminent domain.  State and federal statutes do not 
squarely address the issue.  However, a flexible power of eminent domain is 
necessary to rectify the rare situation in which a preexisting conservation 
easement frustrates an essential public need,96 thereby allowing future 
generations to “remedy the missteps of the past . . . [in order to] meet the 
currently unknowable, ultimately pressing needs of the future.”97  
For example, the federal government has recently provided widespread 
support for clean energy, including the building of large windmills in the 
West.  Presumably, the federal government will face challenges to the 
proposed locations of windmills, with many homeowners likely to express 
“Not In My Back Yard” (“NIMBY”) sentiments that can be politically 
damaging to incumbent candidates.  In response to these challenges, the 
federal government may look to house these windmills on open space land 
along the nation’s interstates since there are fewer homes along the 
interstate and homeowners who already live in close proximity to the 
interstate are less likely to express politically damaging NIMBY sentiments. 
It is highly likely that a significant portion of private open space and scenic 
interstate land in the West is already encumbered by conservation 
Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual against ‘the exercise of 
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective.”‘); Fenster, supra note 91; J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Claims After Lingle, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 471, 472 (2007) (characterizing the likelihood of a property owner’s victory 
with a federal substantive due process claim as “virtually never”). 
95. See Fenster, supra note 91.
96. See Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation
Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, UTAH 
L. REV. 1039, 1083 (2007).
97. See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law:
Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 
1578 (2007). 
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easements that may restrict the building of giant windmill structures on the 
land.  The government could conceivably need to exercise its power of 
eminent domain to condemn such easement-encumbered private land for 
the purpose of building a public windmill.  
The government clearly has the power to condemn privately held 
conservation easement property (i.e., conservation easement property 
interests held by charities).  However issues of competing sovereignty arise 
where one government entity attempts to condemn a conservation 
easement property interest held by another government entity.  The 
remainder of this section discusses whether the existence of a preexisting, 
government-held conservation easement impedes another government 
entity’s ability to exercise its eminent domain powers. 
A. The Effect of the Various Levels of Government Involved
1. Government Entities at the Same Level
This subsection addresses the issue of one government entity’s ability 
to condemn a conservation easement held by another government entity at 
the same level of government.  The Prior Public Use Doctrine prohibits the 
condemnation of land previously set aside for a public use to devote it to an 
inconsistent public use, absent express or implied legislative authorization 
to do so.98  Therefore, the Prior Public Use Doctrine limits the power of 
eminent domain that public bodies at the same level of government may 
exercise over property interests held by one another (since there would 
often be no implied or express authorization among bodies at the same 
level that have only a general delegation of eminent domain authority).99  
The Paramount Public Use Doctrine is an exception to the Prior Public Use 
Doctrine that (where adopted)100 provides greater flexibility for courts to 
allow condemnation of land devoted to a public use.  This is the case even 
when the existing use would be practically destroyed should the 
condemning party show that the proposed use is of paramount public 
importance (relative to the preexisting public use), and that its purpose 
98. See JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.01[1] (rev. 3d ed. 2010)
(providing that states have an inherent power of eminent domain as sovereign powers, 
while local governments are not sovereign and therefore may not exercise the power of 
eminent domain without authorization from the state constitution or legislature). 
99. See United States v. Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land,
753 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.P.R. 1990). 
100. The Paramount Public Use Doctrine exception remains a minority view,
with many courts weary to balance the value of various public uses.  See JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
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cannot be accomplished in any other way.101  In jurisdictions applying the 
Paramount Public Use Doctrine, conservation easements could be 
terminated to make way for necessary economic development where 
legislative intent is not clearly expressed on the matter (i.e., where the 
relative entities involved are at the same level of government and hold a 
general delegation of the power of eminent domain).102  In jurisdictions 
where the Paramount Public Purpose Doctrine is not applied, preexisting 
government-held conservation easements would likely be exempt from the 
exercise of eminent domain by a same level government entity—unless the 
legislature has clearly expressed or implied a grant of eminent domain 
authority against such conservation easements. 
2. State Government Versus Local Government
This subsection addresses the issue of a state to condemn a 
conservation easement held by a municipality/local government, and vice 
versa.  As a sovereign power, a state has a power of eminent domain 
restricted only by the U.S. Constitution and the respective state 
constitution.103  The Prior Public Use Doctrine does not preclude states from 
condemning property owned by local governments, state agencies, 
municipalities, and state or local utilities.104  On the other hand, 
governmental or political subdivisions of a state have no inherent power to 
condemn property of the state and may only be granted such a power by the 
state legislature (either expressly or by necessary implication).105  Thus, a 
state would likely be able to condemn a conservation easement held by a 
local government, municipality, or utility entity.  However, local, municipal, 
and utility entities would likely be unable to condemn a conservation 
easement held by the state.106 
101. See Joris Naiman, Comment, Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property: The
Paramount Public Use Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 893, 895, 898 (1990); JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
102. As with the Prior Public Use Doctrine, the Paramount Public Use Doctrine
exception would only apply in the absence of clear legislative intent. 
103. See 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN § 23 (2007); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1879).  
104. See United States v. City of Tiffin, 190 F. 279, 281 (N.D. Ohio 1911); 1A 
JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.17[4] (rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
105. See A.S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain as Between State and
Subdivision or Agency Thereof, or as Between Different Subdivisions or Agencies Themselves, 35 
A.L.R.3d 1293, 1326 at § 8 (1971).
106. Absent a state statute that prohibits or restricts the exercise of eminent
domain over a conservation easement. 
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3. The Federal Government Versus State/Local Government
This subsection discusses the federal government’s ability to condemn 
a conservation easement held by state/local/municipal government, and vice 
versa.  The federal government derives its power of eminent domain from 
the various enumerated powers granted to it under the United States 
Constitution, including its powers over commerce and post offices.107  Since 
the U.S. Constitution and Congressional statutes have supremacy over state 
authorities, the federal government has the authority to condemn state-
owned lands.108  Since local and municipal governments and utility entities 
are “creatures of the state,” the federal government may condemn the 
property of local and municipal governments and utility entities.109  
Moreover, the federal government is not constrained110 by the Prior Public 
Use or Paramount Public Use Doctrines when condemning state lands.111  By 
contrast, state and local government bodies have no right of eminent 
domain over federal property, absent express consent.112  The fact that state 
107. See 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.02 (rev. 3d ed. 2010). 
108. See e.g., State of Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941)
(stating “The fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by 
the United States.”).  However, the federal power to condemn state-owned lands is 
constrained to the extent that the United States may not “arbitrarily imperil the very 
functions of the State itself.”  See United States v. 4450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 
167, 175 (D. Minn. 1939).  However, the federal condemnation of state-owned 
conservation easements does not appear to rise to the level of arbitrarily imperiling 
the very functions of the State (as would the federal government condemning the 
State Capital, for instance). 
109. See 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 2.19, 2.21 (rev. 3d
ed. 2010). 
110. Although the federal government is not constitutionally prohibited from
condemning state-owned lands beyond the usual constitutional restrictions on 
eminent domain, the federal government may be statutorily limited.  For example, 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
authority to issue permits to public utilities to build or modify electric transmission 
facilities within an approved national electric transmission corridor.  Although these 
permits enable public utilities to exercise the federal power of eminent domain to 
obtain the necessary rights-of-way, they do not grant public utilities the power to 
condemn state-owned or federally owned land.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524).
111. See United States v. Acquisition of 0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation
Land, 753 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.P.R. 1990); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 
U.S. 668, 685 (1896).  
112. See  Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 230 F. 328, 338 (8th Cir. 1915); City 
of Sacramento v. Sec’y of Housing & Urban Dev., 363 F. Supp. 736, 737 (E.D. Cal. 1972). 
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and local governments may not exercise eminent domain over federal-held 
conservation easement may present a problem since many commentators 
believe that local and state government entities have a greater interest in 
advancing local development than does the federal government—thereby 
potentially denying land use dictated by local needs. 
VI. Conclusion
The creative and timely acquisition of conservation easements can
help realize the goals of environmental and land use regulation.113  When the 
use of regulations and conservation easements are well coordinated, the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of each system can be somewhat 
offset.114  Environmental and land use regulations may be effectively 
imposed up until the point in which such regulations either: (1) become 
politically unpalatable or (2) would likely constitute a widespread taking.  At 
such point, the government would be wise to convert to a conservation 
easement approach.  For instance, upon reaching the conversion point, the 
government could increase the tax benefits associated with donations and 
partial sales of conservation easements that are considered “qualified 
conservation contributions.”  Alternatively, the government could increase 
funding to both government and charitable land conservation entities, in 
order to facilitate a market for selling conservation easements.  Subsidizing 
the market for the sale of conservation easements could: (1) undermine a 
claim that regulations have diminished the value of land use and 
development rights to the point of such regulations constituting a 
compensable Fifth amendment taking; and (2) increase the number and size 
of conservation easements in general.  Increasing the tax incentives and 
funding of conservation purchasing organizations would be the ideal 
manners in which to acquire the conservation easements since these 
methods would allow the government to avoid paying full just 
compensation in exchange for offering either: (1) federal tax deductions, the 
amount of which has already been reduced by the effect of the land use and 
environmental regulations115; or (2) a reduced purchase price since the value 
113. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 414-15.
114. Id. at 415.
115. The fair market value of the property, before contribution of the
easement, should also take into account an objective assessment of how immediate 
or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would be 
developed.  Where applicable, valuation of the property before contribution should 
take into account land use and environmental regulations that would already restrict 
development of the property.  See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, supra note 28, at 15.  See also 
Whitehouse Hotel LP v. Commissioner, 131 TC 112 (2008); IRS Conservation Easement 
Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, (Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
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of the land has already been limited by land use and environmental 
regulations. 
“Exacted” conservation easements may constitute a useful 
conservation tool for cash-strapped government entities where such 
“exactions” avoid the requirement of just compensation.  Government 
“exactions” of conservation easements could conceivably avoid the payment 
of full just compensation.  However, public policy seems to dictate that the 
arrangement should be considered a true exaction, and thus subject to the 
heightened Nollan/Dolan test for determining whether the arrangement 
constitutes a regulatory taking.  A conservation easement “exaction” that is 
viewed as coercive or extortionate would likely require the payment of just 
compensation under Nollan/Dolan, and could even be completely invalidated 
if found to be an arbitrary and capricious violation of due process under 
Lingle.  Due to the uncertainty surrounding conservation easement 
“exactions,” government entities should be careful to draft the terms of the 
arrangement so as to avoid the appearance of anything approaching 
coercion or extortion.  Furthermore, conservation easements that are 
“exacted” in a coercive manner may face political pressures similar to those 
present in the regulatory arena and in the case of the government’s exercise 
of eminent domain to acquire full fee simple interests. 
Whatever tools the government uses to acquire a conservation 
easement, the government should be careful to craft good comprehensive 
conservation policies that are flexible enough to prevent inefficient land 
planning to meet the needs of the future (which is not environmentally or 
economically beneficial).  The conservation community must be careful to 
avoid too much federal or state involvement in conservation easements as 
the popularity of conservation easements continues to grow around the 
country—increasing in number and size.  This is because conservation 
easements held by the state or federal government would be unable to be 
condemned by local or municipal entities under their power of eminent 
domain.  Local and municipal level government entities (i.e., zoning boards) 
often play a much more significant part in effective land use planning than 
does the federal government since local and municipal entities are more 
adept and better located to factor in community specific concerns. 
Therefore, there is a need to balance the benefits of direct federal and state 
involvement in conservation easements with the land use limitations 
imposed on local zoning boards because of such state and federal direct 
involvement.  
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/conservation_easement.pdf (holding that a use must 
be legally permissible in order for such use to qualify as the highest and best use for 
the purpose of valuing an easement property interest precontribution. 
